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I. INTRODUCTION 
Patent protection, as a part of the larger package of intellectual property 
protection, plays a prominent role in today’s free trade agreement negotiations.1 
As the business of pharmaceuticals increases internationally, the degree of 
protection nations incorporate into these agreements has a direct effect on access 
to medicine around the world.2 As a matter of intellectual property, the premier 
governing document is the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property (“TRIPS”).3 TRIPS creates, at a minimum, floors which signatory 
countries must implement into their respective domestic policies.4 In a post-
TRIPS world, however, we see countries increasingly relying on bilateral 
agreements to achieve higher standards of intellectual property rights.5 These 
higher standards have a particularly debilitating effect on how lower income 
countries provide their citizens access to life-saving medication.6 
Scientific innovation in the area of anti-retroviral drugs has turned an HIV-
positive diagnosis into something that is manageable, where just twenty years 
ago it may have well been a death sentence.7 However, HIV/AIDS very much 
remains an epidemic, especially in lesser-developed countries where access to 
anti-retrovirals is a problem.8 Providing treatment for HIV/AIDS is about much 
more than improving quality of life for those infected, it is about curbing the 
rapid spread of the virus.9 Access to these medicines, however, remains a 
problem for middle to low-income countries.10 In 2010, for example, UNAIDS 
 
1. See Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha “Solution,” 3 CHI. 
J. INT’L L. 47, 47 (2002). 
2. See id. at 58-59. 
3. See GRAEME B. DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PATENT LAW 231-32 
(2002). 
4. Annette Kur & Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Enough is Enough—The Notion of Binding Ceilings in 
International Intellectual Property Protection 9 (Max Planck Inst. for Intellectual Prop., Competition & Tax 
Law Research Paper Series No. 09-01, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1326429; see also Henning 
Grosse Ruse-Khan, The International Law Relation Between TRIPS and Subsequent TRIPS-Plus Free Trade 
Agreements: Towards Safeguarding Flexibilities?, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 325, 328-29 (2011) (discussing 
whether treaty interpretation norms allow the policy flexibilities found in TRIPS to be preserved despite higher 
protections in TRIPS-plus agreements). 
5. See infra Part III. 
6. See Ruse-Kahn, supra note 4, at 329-30.  
7. See UNAIDS, OUTLOOK REPORT OF JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS 64-71 
(2011), available at http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/documents/unaidspublication/ 
2011/20110607_jc2069_30outlook_en.pdf (tracking the progress of treatments developed for HIV/AIDS over 
the last thirty years); Miles D. White, Drug Patents Are Good for Our Health, PHRMA.ORG, 
http://www.phrma.org/drug-patents-are-good-our-health (last visited Jan. 11, 2012). 
8. See generally MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES, UNTANGLING THE WEB OF ANTIRETROVIRAL PRICE 
REDUCTIONS (14th ed. 2011), available at apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s18716en/ 
s18716en.pdf. 
9. Id. 
10. Horace E. Anderson, Jr., We Can Work it Out: Co-Op Compulsory Licensing as the Way Forward in 
Improving Access to Anti-Retroviral Drugs, 16 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 167, 171 (2010). 
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reported that the adult HIV prevalence was five percent in Sub-Saharan Africa; 
globally, 2.5 million children under the age of fifteen are living with HIV.11 In 
contrast to those numbers, only twenty-eight percent of patients outside of North 
America have access to anti-retroviral therapy.12 
“Access” in this context means much more than physical access; in many 
cases, the drugs exist but are priced far out of reach. Existing free trade 
agreements, and new agreements that are being negotiated, such as the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement (“TPPA”), affect a country’s intellectual property 
scheme which, in turn, affects how quickly new drugs become available in both 
the physical and pricing sense.13 As such, the humanitarian and public health 
voice can be heard loud and clear amidst today’s trade negotiations dealing with 
international intellectual property protections.14 This voice sees access to health 
as a fundamental human right not to be ignored.15  
Also prominent is the voice of the “market fundamentalist,” urging higher 
patent protection, the absence of which, they argue, would stifle further innovation 
by lowering incentives.16 Pharmaceuticals are unique in that many research and 
development endeavors end in failure.17 Furthermore, the costs of research and 
development are a significant portion of the total production cost.18 In turn, even 
the smallest return on investment from a successful product keeps the incentive for 
more research and development alive.19 In the context of AIDS medication, Abbot 
Pharmaceuticals’ CEO poses a question: AIDS “is a disease that is always new—
due to the constant evolution of the virus—and requires new solutions. Where will 
these come from if we hobble the patent system that drives innovation?”20 Given 
the foregoing, this argument makes sense. However, what if, on a global scale, 
intellectual property rights become so extreme that they begin to discourage 
 
11 UNAIDS, GLOBAL REPORT FACT SHEET 1 (2010), available at www.unaids.org/documents/201011 
23_FS_Global_em_en.pdf. 
12. Id. at  2. 
13. See infra Part IV for a discussion on intellectual property rights-related negotiations for the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement. 
14. See, e.g., JOSEPH BRENNER & ELLEN R. SHAFFER, CTR. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS ON TRADE & HEALTH, 
COMMENTS CONCERNING PROPOSED UNITED STATES-TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP TRADE AGREEMENT 17 (2010), 
available at http://www.cpath.org/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/p-cpathontpp1-25-2010.pdf (recommending that 
the TPPA not contain any TRIPS-plus provisions). 
15. Anderson, Jr., supra note 10, at 176-77; see also Ellen ‘t Hoen, Report of the Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health: A Call to Governments, 84 BULL. WORLD HEALTH 
ORG. 421, 422 (2006), available at www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/84/5/421.pdf. The World Health 
Organization uses framework set forth by the United Nations to define the “right to health”: availability, 
acceptability, accessibility and quality. See id. This Comment deals with intellectual property policy that affects 
accessibility by keeping medicines priced out of reach for many. 
16. Anderson, Jr., supra note 10, at 177-79; see Sykes, supra note 1, at 60-62. 
17. Sykes, supra note 1, at 61.  
18. Id. at  60.  
19. See id. 
20. White, supra note 7. 
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pharmaceutical innovation and competition, all the while stifling access to life-
saving drugs? This result is not good for either side of the debate. 
In Part II, this Comment lays out the provisions of TRIPS and the changes 
made by the Doha Declaration on Public Health (“DOHA Declaration”). This is a 
necessary foundation to any discussion about intellectual property rights and public 
health. Part III will examine TRIPS-plus intellectual property rights: data 
exclusivity, parallel importation, and patent/registration linkage. It will focus on the 
effects these higher protections have on access to essential medicines, such as anti-
retrovirals, in developing countries. In addition, Part III will discuss how to 
reconcile these intellectual property rights with the DOHA Declaration, and 
explore the Central American Free Trade Agreement (“CAFTA”) as an example of 
a TRIPS-plus agreement. Finally, Part IV will examine negotiations and proposed 
text for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. 
This Comment will conclude with a recommendation that a socially 
responsible Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement should not include the extensive 
TRIPS-plus protections seen in recent bilateral trade agreements. While still in 
negotiations, even a potential Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement that 
incorporates unconditional data exclusivity,21 patent/ registration linkage,22 and a 
prohibition of parallel importation23 can only serve to pad the monetary interests of 
the already-thriving pharmaceutical industry.24 At the same time, it would further 
stifle access to life-saving drugs in already-struggling, lesser-developed countries. 
Lastly, it is not enough to provide a textual acknowledgement to TRIPS 
flexibilities and the DOHA Declaration on Public Health if the actual provisions do 
not allow for public health improvements through access in the poorest corners of 
the world.25 
II. THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE DOHA DECLARATION ON PUBLIC HEALTH 
A.  The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Before 1995, a comprehensive agreement did not exist to provide 
international intellectual property protection.26 This being the case, nations were 
 
21. See infra Part III.A. 
22. See infra Part III.C. 
23. See infra Part III.B. 
24. Press Release, Jerry Carey, Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., Authors Dispute "Innovation Crisis" 
among Pharmaceutical Companies (Aug. 8, 2012), available at http://www.umdnj.edu/cgi-bin/ 
cgiwrap/hpappweb/newsroom.cgi?month=08&day=08&year=12&headline=Authors+Dispute++Innovation+Cri
sis++among+Pharmaceutical+Companies. 
25. Bryan Mercurio, Resolving the Public Health Crisis in the Developing World: Problems and 
Barriers of Access to Essential Medicines, 5 Nw. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 7 (2006).   
26. Frederick M. Abbot & Jerome H. Rechman, The Doha Round’s Public Health Legacy: Strategies for 
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free to fashion their own patent system, some excluding pharmaceuticals from 
patent protection altogether.27 TRIPS was a landmark attempt to remedy this gap 
in the body of international trade law by providing minimum levels of intellectual 
property protection.28 TRIPS is a supplemental agreement to that which created 
the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) in 1994,29 and adherence to TRIPS is a 
requirement of WTO membership.30 This relationship forced countries to evaluate 
the value of WTO membership as a whole, despite “any detriment from 
providing protection to foreign intellectual property.”31 By including sweeping 
intellectual property mandates in agreements with broad subject-matter coverage 
(like potentially the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement), developing countries 
may accede because the trade benefits carry greater weight than the potential 
harm of the chapter on intellectual property.32 The likely compromise in this 
situation is built-in exceptions. As is true with negotiations of today’s free-trade 
agreements, the disparate intellectual property policies and concerns of 
developed versus developing countries resulted in TRIPS containing certain 
exemptions to the patent provisions of TRIPS, often referred to as 
“flexibilities.”33 
TRIPS mandates that member countries provide patents for “any inventions, 
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are 
new, involve an inventive step, and are capable of industrial application.”34 
Patents must provide the holder with exclusive rights to prevent development, 
use, sale, and importation by others without consent of the patent holder.35 Article 
31 provides a major exception, or flexibility, to these baseline requirements: 
compulsory licensing.36 
 
the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INT’L ECON. 
L. 921, 927 (2007). 
27. Id. 
28. See Donald Harris, TRIPS After Fifteen Years: Success or Failure, As Measured By Compulsory Licensing, 
18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 367, 369 (2011). 
29. DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 3, at 231-32. 
30. DANIEL C.K. CHOW & EDWARD LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 25-26 (2006). 
31. DINWOODIE ET AL., supra note 3. 
32. CHOW & LEE, supra note 30. 
33. Sykes, supra note 1, at 50-55. In addition to the flexibilities, TRIPS members also operate on 
different deadlines for implementing treaty provisions to account for the many countries which are at a lesser 
stage of economic development.  CHOW & LEE, supra note 30. 
34. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27, § 1, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1896 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 
1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at art. 31. 
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B.  Compulsory Licensing Under TRIPS 
Compulsory licensing remains a controversial public-health resource.37 The 
basic tenet of compulsory licensing is that it allows a government or government-
approved third party, usually a generic manufacturer, to obtain limited use rights 
for a drug without the patent owner’s consent.38 TRIPS provides conditions that 
must be met before a compulsory license may be issued. It prescribes, in 
pertinent part, that a proposed user must first make efforts to negotiate 
authorization on “reasonable commercial terms and conditions.”39 If, after a 
“reasonable period of time” these negotiations have failed, a compulsory license 
may be granted.40 However, the subsection also provides exceptions, providing 
for waiver of the negotiation period in cases of national emergency, extreme 
urgency, non-commercial use by the government, or to remedy anti-competitive 
practices.41 Once granted, a compulsory license does not come with the same 
exclusivity rights as a patent.42 Just as compulsory licenses may only be issued in 
limited situations, the rights associated with the license are equally limited.43 
Especially relevant to this discussion is the requirement that the use “be 
authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market.”44 In practice, 
this provision highlights one of TRIPS’ shortcomings, at least from the vantage 
point of developing countries and humanitarians.45 Many of the least-developed 
countries lack the manufacturing capability to produce drugs domestically under 
a compulsory license.46 It follows that many of the countries for which this 
flexibility was intended would be unable to utilize the flexibility.47 
In 2001, faced with a growing HIV/AIDS crisis, South Africa enacted a piece 
of legislation that issued a compulsory license to produce AIDS medicines to 
 
37. See e.g., Harris, supra note 28, at 383-96 (evaluating the success or failure of the TRIPS agreement 
measure by the various usage of compulsory licensing by members to the agreement and restrictions on the 
licensing in subsequent agreements). 
38. Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_faq_e.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2012). 
39. TRIPS, supra note 34, at art. 31(b). 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at art. 31(b)-(k). The 2001 Doha Declaration makes clear that member countries have “the right 
to determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency” and explicitly 
categorizes a crisis related to HIV/AIDS as one such circumstance. World Trade Organization, Ministerial 
Declaration of 14 November 2001 on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, para. 1, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 
41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. 
42. TRIPS, supra note 34, at art. 31(b)-(k) 
43. Id. The terms and conditions in Article 31 “weakened compulsory licensing as an access tool by, 
among other things, requiring negotiations with the patent holder…limiting the scope and duration…, and 
limiting compulsory licensing to use in supplying the domestic (non-export) market.” Anderson, Jr., supra note 
10. 
44. TRIPS, supra note 34, at art. 31(f). 
45. Harris, supra note 28, at 386. 
46. Id. at 384-86. 
47. Id. at 387. 
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local manufacturers.48 However, the new law also allowed the country to import 
the drugs from countries that produced it at a lower cost than the patent owner.49 
In response, the patent owners filed suit, claiming that the legislation violated 
TRIPS because the law “allowed the South African health minister to act 
unilaterally without first having to prove a drug manufacturer abused its patent,” 
and issued compulsory licenses without first obtaining the patent owners’ 
consent.50 The suit was eventually dismissed but it was this landscape that gave 
rise to the DOHA Declaration on Public Health and the subsequent TRIPS 
amendment.51 
C.  The DOHA Declaration on Public Health 
In 2001, the World Trade Organization released the Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.52 Though it is not a legally binding 
amendment to TRIPS, the Declaration is persuasive authority for interpretation of 
what TRIPS requires, especially regarding compulsory licensing.53 The 
Declaration lends public health-oriented interpretative guidance to TRIPS 
provisions by highlighting the “gravity of the public health problems afflicting 
many developing and least-developed countries, especially those resulting from 
HIV/AIDS . . . .”54 Further, the Declaration expressly asserts that TRIPS “can and 
should be interpreted in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect 
public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.”55 
While the Declaration clarified that HIV/AIDS satisfied the national 
emergency requirement, it also expressly declined to address the issue of parallel 
imports,56 leaving it open for individual Member regulation.57 The Declaration 
also urged the TRIPS Council to find an “expeditious solution” to the problem 
posed in countries, like South Africa, with “insufficient or no manufacturing 
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector.”58 The solution, first implemented 
through an interim waiver and now in a proposed amendment,59 allows a country 
 
48. Id. at 384-86. 
49. Id.  This concept is called parallel importation and is discussed, infra, Part III.B. 
50. Id.  at 384-85. 
51. Id.  at 384-86; see infra Part II.C. 
52. Doha Declaration, supra note 41. 
53. Sykes, supra note 1, at 54.  
54. Doha Declaration, supra note 41, at para. 1. 
55. Id. 
56. See infra Part III.B (discussing parallel importation of drugs). 
57. Doha Declaration, supra note 41, at para. 5(d). 
58. Id. 
59. Laura Chung, Use of Paragraph 6 System for Access to Medicine, 36 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 
137, 143 (2010). To amend TRIPS permanently, the amendment must be ratified by two-thirds of WTO 
members. Though less than a third of member countries have formally accepted the amendment, the interim 
waiver will continue to apply until ratification is complete. The deadline for ratification has been extended a 
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that is incapable of manufacturing generics under a compulsory license to legally 
import generics from countries that do possess the manufacturing capacity.60 
III. COMMON FEATURES OF A TRIPS-PLUS AGREEMENT 
This Part will discuss those TRIPS-plus intellectual property rights that have 
been proposed by the United States in Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
negotiations. It will conclude with brief discussion of the Central American Free 
Trade Agreement as an example of an agreement that contains these provisions. 
A.  Data Exclusivity  
TRIPS requires member countries to take measures to protect data (e.g. 
testing data) against “unfair commercial usage,” production of which “involves a 
considerable effort,” if data submission is a condition to market approval of 
products containing a new chemical entity.61 The United States and European 
Union, in implementing TRIPS into their respective laws, provide for data 
exclusivity.62 The United States, for example, provides for five years of test data 
(and marketing) exclusivity for new chemical entities.63 This means that a generic 
drug application containing the same new chemical entity may not be registered 
until the end of the fifth year.64 However, because it takes, on average, eighteen 
months for the generic drug to be approved, the brand drug effectively enjoys 
marketing exclusivity longer than five years.65 In contrast, EU patent holders 
enjoy eight years of data exclusivity plus an additional two years of marketing 
 
third time to December 31, 2013. Members Accepting Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE 
ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm (last updated May 29, 2012). 
60. Harris, supra note 28, at 386. This waiver, however, has only been used once, between Canada as the 
exporter and Rwanda as the importer. Harris argues that the lack of use of the amendment is due to the process 
for utilizing it being complicated and disjointed, fear of retaliation, and bilateral trade restrictions. See id. at 
391-94. 
61. TRIPS, supra note 34, at art. 39.3. As the language used in this provision is broad, there is a debate 
over whether Article 39.3 really requires data exclusivity by its language or whether protection below the level 
of exclusivity would suffice. See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Secrecy, Monopoly, and Access to Pharmaceuticals in 
International Trade Law: Protection of Marketing Approval Data Under the TRIPS Agreement, 45 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 443, 446-65, 499 (2004) (examining the language of Article 39.3 and advocating for a solution that 
preserves incentives to create via trade secret protection without impeding access to medicines in developing 
countries). 
62. Fellmeth, supra note 61, at 447-48. 
63. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii) (2001). A “new chemical entity” is a drug in which the molecule or ion 
responsible for the drug’s physiological or pharmacological action has not been approved by the Federal Drug 
Administration in any other application. 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(a) (2011). 
64. 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b)(2). 
65. MARTIN A. VOET, THE GENERIC CHALLENGE: UNDERSTANDING PATENTS, FDA & PHARMA-
CEUTICAL LIFE-CYCLE MANAGEMENT 59 (2005); Fiona M. Scott Morton, Barriers to Entry, Brand Advertising, 
and Generic Entry in the US Pharmaceutical Industry, 18 INT’L J. OF INDUS. ORG. 1085, 1090 (2000). 
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exclusivity.66 In effect, a generic application may not be registered until the end 
of the data exclusivity period and may not be launched into the market until after 
marketing exclusivity has lapsed.67 
In bilateral trade agreements subsequent to TRIPS, the United States has 
pushed for, and achieved, data exclusivity provisions, as opposed to the lower 
threshold of simple data protection.68 This is not a surprising move, given the 
position of United States that TRIPS requires a period of exclusivity for 
marketing data: 
The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) has interpreted 
Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement to mean that “the data will not be 
used to support, clear or otherwise review other applications for 
marketing approval for a set amount of time . . . . Any other definition of 
this term would be inconsistent with logic and the negotiating history of 
the provision.”69 
Construing Article 39.3 this strictly is probably above the minimum standard 
that TRIPS creates.70 Professor Brook K. Baker argues that the language used in 
Article 39.3 does not support mandating data exclusivity as the only logical 
interpretation.71 
Notwithstanding compulsory licensing schemes, data exclusivity generally 
delays the availability of generic medicines,72 which are typically sold at more 
affordable prices than their branded counterparts.73 The potential delay is caused 
by two implications of a data exclusivity scheme.74 The first is that a generics 
manufacturer, in lieu of waiting for the exclusivity period to expire, would need 
 
66. EUROPEAN COMM’N, PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR INQUIRY PRELIMINARY REPORT 107-08 (Nov. 28, 
2008) (DG Competition Staff Working Paper), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/ 
pharmaceuticals/inquiry/preliminary_report.pdf. 
67. Id. at 108. 
68. Peter K. Yu, The Political Economy of Data Protection, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 777, 783-84 (2010). 
69. CARLOS MARIA CORREA, PROTECTION OF DATA SUBMITTED FOR THE REGISTRATION OF 
PHARMACEUTICALS: IMPLEMENTING STANDARDS OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 47 (2002) (quoting the Office of 
the U.S. Trade Representative interpreting Article 39.3 of the TRIPS agreement in an unattributed paper for 
submission in bilateral discussions with Australia in May, 1995). 
70. See id. at 48.  
71. Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data Exclusivity and Patent/ 
Registration Linkage, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 303, 315 (2008). 
72. Access to Medicines: Data Exclusivity and Other “TRIPS-Plus” Measures, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 
(Mar. 2006), http://www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/Global_Trade_and_Health_GTH_No3.pdf [hereinafter Access 
to Medicines]; see also Yu, supra note 68, at 78 (“Such delay, along with the reduced price competition, is 
likely to prolong, or even exacerbate, the massive public health crises in less developed countries. It is also 
wasteful and highly undesirable to require duplicative testing in countries that have very limited economic 
resources.”).  
73. David W. Freeman, Prescription Drug Prices Set to Fall as Patents Expire, CBS NEWS (July 25, 
2011, 11:37 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504763_162-20082918-10391704.html. 
74. Access to Medicines, supra note 72. 
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to repeat clinical trials for and produce their own data.75 Second, in a more 
common scenario, a generics manufacturer would need to wait until the 
exclusivity period is over to launch their product.76 
B.  Parallel Importation 
Parallel importation is one way that a country can reduce drug costs by 
procuring the drug at a price lower than what is available locally, assuming that 
the savings are passed on to the consumer.77 Under this scheme, once a drug has 
been sold with the consent of the patent owner anywhere in the world, the rights 
are said to be exhausted and the owner may not protest importation into a 
different country.78 Allowing parallel importation “favors consumer interests and 
access to medicine, because countries are free to import products from the 
country where they are legitimately sold for the lowest possible price.”79 On the 
other hand, pharmaceutical business models rely on price differentials for 
different markets.80 Allowing parallel imports means these differentials would be 
moot, as the consumer would be able to find and then import the drug at its 
cheapest.81 As TRIPS is silent on this issue82 and the DOHA Declaration 
expressly leaves resolution of the issue up to each member country,83 the parallel 
import restrictions are on the table in today’s trade negotiations. Because 
restrictions on parallel trade affect pricing differentials, the World Health 
Organization notes that it may be beneficial for developed countries to include 
restrictions in their domestic laws to preserve lower pricing in developing 
countries.84 On the other hand, developing countries may benefit from less 
restriction on parallel imports.85 
There are, of course, moral implications of allowing parallel imports for 
some markets but not others.86 The first is the temptation to divert drugs intended 
for a developing country into a high-income, developed country.87 The second is 
 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. WORLD HEALTH ORG., PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 123 
(2006), available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/documents/thereport/ENPublicHealth Report.pdf. 
78. Cynthia M. Ho, A New World Order for Addressing Patent Rights and Public Health, 82 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 1469, 1501 n.147 (2007). 
79. Id. at 1501. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. TRIPS, supra note 34.  
83. Doha Declaration, supra note 41. 
84. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 77, at 124. 
85. See id. 
86. See Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in Inte-rnational 
Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 193, 265-68 (2005). 
87. See id. at 266-67. 
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the temptation for a market consumer with the means to pay for the drug to 
substitute it with drugs imported at a cheaper cost, which are intended for poorer 
populations.88 One remedy is a ban on parallel importing and reliance on pricing 
differentials.89 However, the better remedy is for developed countries to monitor 
borders and criminalize diversion practices.90 Kevin Outterson suggests that this 
can be combined with persuasive appeals to the consumer’s morals: if you are a 
high-income patient who takes a pill clearly intended for the impoverished, you 
are stealing from the poor.91 Furthermore, he argues, the burden of anti-diversion 
measures should fall on high-income markets because that is where the necessary 
resources and infrastructure for implementation exist.92 
In the context of trade-negotiations, the concept of parallel imports and 
necessary considerations illustrate that a one-size-fits-all approach will not work 
when negotiating an agreement between countries of disparate development and 
income levels.93 Thus, in a potential agreement like the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement, regulation of parallel importation should be left to individual 
countries.94 
C.  Patent/Registration Linkage 
Patent/registration linkage is a relatively new patent concept, first appearing 
in the domestic policies of the United States and Canada about twenty-five years 
ago.95 Traditionally, the regulatory body governing drug registration and approval 
functions independently from the patent system.96 With a linkage regulatory 
system, however, the two processes are “linked” and the drug regulatory body 
becomes a patent enforcer.97 
 
88. See id. at 266. 
89. EU Commission Extends Ban on Parallel Imports, PHARM. INDUS. NEWS (Oct. 16, 1995), 
http://www.thepharmaletter.com/file/68996/eu-commission-extends-ban-on-parallel-imports.html. 
90. See Outterson, supra note 86, at 266-67. 
91. See id. at 266 
92. See id. at 265-66  (The European Union, which practices community exhaustion, permits parallel 
trade within the European Economic Area. To identify products for the poor, all pharmaceuticals exported from 
the European Union bear a distinguishing logo). 
93. See One Size Fits All Will Not Work in Trade Negotiations: Kamal Nath—Inequitous System Will Hit 
Trade Flows from Developed Countries, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT (Mar. 12, 2007), http://www. 
carnegieendowment.org/files/pressrelease.pdf. 
94. See Intellectual Licensing—Structuring Deals Worldwide, LADAS & PARRY LLP, http://www. 
ladas.com/IPProperty/GrayMarket/GrayMa02.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2012). 
95. See Ron A. Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby: Canada’s Continuing Support of U.S. Linkage 
Regulation for Pharmaceuticals, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 71, 134 (2011) (The United States 
implemented a linkage regime with passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984). 
96. Laba Karki, NEIFELD IP LAW, P.C., Review of FDA Law Related to Pharmaceuticals: The Hatch-
Waxman Act, Regulatory Amendments and Implications for Drug Patent Enforcement, at 1-2, 
http://www.neifeld.com/pubs/reviewoffdalawrelatedtopharm.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2012). 
97. Baker, supra note 71, at 307. 
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The Hatch-Waxman Act98 in the United States illustrates how linkage works 
in regards to a generics application.99 When generics producers want to file an 
equivalent of an already-registered drug with the Food and Drug Administration, 
they must first certify that “there were no competing patents, that all patents had 
expired, that the registration would not become final until patent expiration, or 
that the alleged patent was invalid or would not be infringed.”100 In the case 
where the filer is certifying invalidity or non-infringement, notice must be 
provided to the patent holder, who then has forty-five days to bring an action for 
infringement.101 This results in an influx of costly litigation and further delay of 
generics, despite the fact that oftentimes the outcome of the litigation is 
invalidation of the registered patent.102 Further, this is inappropriate because a 
legal presumption of validity is established for the registered patent on the health 
regulation end, despite a generic meeting the technical requirements to register.103 
In contrast, EU “[h]ealth authorities have no legal capacity to look into 
[intellectual property rights] issues and deny approval to an application that 
conforms to the relevant technical standards, even if there [was a patent] 
infringement . . . .”104 It should be noted, however, that some EU member nations 
have attempted to implement linkage regimes despite it being a prohibited 
practice.105 Furthermore, recent free trade agreements (“FTAs”) have addressed 
patent/registration linkage by either strongly encouraging implementation106 or 
mandating it.107 
To understand the serious implications of a linkage regime, it is important to 
recognize that the vast majority of new patents are for drugs other than new 
chemical entities.108 Most patents obtained are for the same drug in a different 
product by patenting a different pharmaceutical formulation (different 
administration form of the same active ingredient), or a combination of known 
drugs.109 This allows an experienced pharmaceutical company to layer their 
patents with little innovative efforts, effectively extending the patent term via the 
cumulative impact of multiple patents.110 Not only does this hurt pharmaceutical 
 
98. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006) (abbreviated new drug applications). 
99. Baker, supra note 71, at 307. 
100. Id.; see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)-(IV). 
101. Baker, supra note 71, at 307. 
102. Carlos M. Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property: Defeating The WTO System for Access to 
Medicines, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 79, 91 (2004). 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 90. 
105. Ron A. Bouchard et al., Structure-Function Analysis of Global Pharmaceutical Linkage 
Regulations, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 391 (2011). 
106. Baker, supra note 71, at 340. 
107. See supra Part III.D. (discussing CAFTA as an example of a linkage-mandating FTA). 
108. Correa, supra note 102, at 89. 
109. Id. at 89 nn.37-38. 
110. Bouchard, supra note 95, at 105 (highlighting Dr. Stephen Schondelmeyer’s assertion that 
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innovation, it also causes extraordinary market-entry delay for the generic 
competitor.111 More troublesome is that TRIPS flexibilities are not equipped to 
deal with this kind of restriction, and thus a loophole is created.112 When 
combined with data exclusivity, granting a compulsory license is rendered 
especially illusory, “as prospective compulsory licensees are unlikely to have 
sufficient incentives to replicate test data, and governments cannot normally wait 
until a new set . . . has been developed.”113 
D. Reconciling the DOHA Declaration and TRIPS Flexibilities in TRIPS-Plus 
Agreements 
Some scholarship suggests that while TRIPS certainly created a minimum 
standard for intellectual property protection, there may also be binding “ceilings” 
in place imposed by TRIPS and other sources of international law.114 Explicit in 
TRIPS is the right, but not obligation, of signatories to provide higher intellectual 
property protection than required, “provided that such protection does not 
contravene the provisions” of TRIPS.115 Without more specific language, 
subsequent FTAs that limit TRIPS flexibilities would likely be upheld as consistent 
with the tradition of TRIPS being a floor and not a ceiling.116 
Including language that preserves the flexibility found in TRIPS is important 
because that language carries a great deal of interpretive power. The most 
important flexibilities in regard to public health are found in the DOHA 
Declaration; the best way to uphold these flexibilities in subsequent FTAs is to 
incorporate similar or identical language, rather than language that is “ambiguous” 
or “open-textured.”117 According to Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, “the more 
specifically or demandingly a clause refers to the DOHA Declaration, the more 
effective it is in safeguarding TRIPS flexibilities . . . .”118 To the extent that the 
DOHA Declaration continues to have legal significance, the members of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership are obligated to incorporate such specific language in order to 
 
assessment of the impact made by Canada’s linkage regime must take into consideration the effect of multiple 
patents). 
111. Id. at 105. 
112. Harris, supra note 28, at 394. 
113. Correa, supra note 102, at 92. 
114. Kur & Ruse-Khan, supra note 4, at 9; see also Ruse-Khan, supra note 4, at 350-64 (discussing 
whether treaty interpretation norms allow the policy flexibilities found in TRIPS to be preserved despite higher 
protections in TRIPS-plus agreements). 
115. TRIPS, supra note 34, at art. 1:1. 
116. Ruse-Khan, supra note 4, at 364. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 358. 
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incorporate with certainty the public health-related aims embodied in the DOHA 
Declaration.119 
CAFTA, to which the United States is a party, is a prime example of one such 
agreement that contains significantly higher intellectual property protection than 
what is required by TRIPS.120 While it does not place restrictions on parallel 
importation, CAFTA requires data exclusivity121 and patent/registration linkage122 
of its member states. However, it also includes an affirmation of existing rights and 
obligations under TRIPS.123 In addition, the parties to CAFTA released an 
“understanding” regarding public health and creating access to medicines.124 This 
release specifically acknowledges that CAFTA does not interfere with a member 
state’s ability to address epidemics, including HIV/AIDS, and in “circumstances of 
extreme urgency or national emergency.”125 This language, which reflects 
provisions found in the DOHA Declaration, coupled with language affirming 
specific TRIPS-flexibilities, is a good example of what is urged supra as a 
necessary component of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement.126 However, 
even the most specific affirmation of public-health policy cannot remedy the 
practical effects of an agreement that incorporates every major intellectual property 
protection available (data-exclusivity, patent extensions, patent/registration 
linkage, and restrictions on parallel importation), and it appears that the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement is headed toward a similar fate. 
V. THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 
A.  Background 
This Part will examine negotiations between the United States and eight 
other Asia-Pacific partners.127 Throughout the negotiation process, there has been 
 
119. See id.  at 353-54.  Most signatories to FTAs include references in their agreements to further the 
goals of the Doha Declaration. 
120. Correa, supra note 102, at 82. 
121. CAFTA provides five-year exclusivity for marketing data of a patented product. During this time, 
third parties (for example, a generics manufacturer) may not “market a product on the basis of (1) the 
information, or (2) the approval granted to the person who submitted the information . . .” Dominican Republic-
Central America Free Trade Agreement art. 15.10.1(a), Aug. 5, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 514 [hereinafter CAFTA]. This 
is in-line with the data exclusivity that the United States affords to patent holders. 21 U.S.C. § 335(c)(3)(E)(ii) 
(2001); see also Fellmeth, supra note 61, at 447-48 (comparing data exclusivity systems in the United States 
and European Union with practices in developing countries).  
122. CAFTA, supra note 121, at art. 15.10.2.  
123. Id. at art. 15.1.7.  
124. See Understanding Regarding Certain Public Health Measures, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE (Aug. 5, 2004), 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/cafta/asset_upload_file697_3975.pdf. 
125. Id. 
126. See supra Part III.D. 
127. The United States in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
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considerable concern expressed by all participating countries with respect to the 
proposed intellectual property provisions, probably in light of the fact that these 
are agreements between developed countries with a strong pharmaceutical 
presence and developing countries with little to none. 128 
The TPPA is a developing agreement between the United States, Australia, 
Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam.129 In 
October 2011, Japan began evaluating whether they would join the negotiations 
as well.130 In November, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, 
Mexico, Canada, and the Philippines also expressed interest,131 though as of 
October 2011, these countries had not begun the formal accession process.132 
Negotiations began for the TPPA in March 2010, and since then negotiations 
have gone through several subsequent rounds.133 
The TPPA is unlike any other trade agreement in that it departs from the 
bilateral model and attempts to harmonize the hundreds of “overlapping and 
inconsistent [free trade agreements] proliferating the globe.”134 The end goal is a 
“living” agreement with comprehensive coverage and eventual expansion of the 
agreement to include more Asia-Pacific economies in the future.135 To achieve the 
 
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/november/united-states-trans-pacific-partnership (last 
visited July 15, 2012). 
128. See e.g., Krista Cox, KEI Notes From Eighth Round of TPPA Negotiations (Sep. 18, 2011, 4:22 
PM), KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L, http://keionline.org/node/1263 (“As a whole, it appears that there is 
growing and vocal opposition to USTR’s aggressive IP positions.”); EU-India Free Trade Agreement: Generic 
Medications Under Threat, Says UN Health Expert, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. (Dec. 10, 2010), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10592&LangID=E%22%3Enews%2
0release (commenting that “[t]he EU-India draft FTA, as it stands, places trade interests over human rights. 
. . .”). 
129. Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr. gov/tpp 
(last visited Oct. 23, 2011). 
130. Press Release, Deputy Chief James P. Zumwalt, U.S. Embassy, Japan, DCM Zumwalt Welcomes 
Discussion of Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (Oct. 7, 2011), available at http://japan.usembassy. 
gov/e/p/tp-20111014-01.html. The addition of Japan to the TPPA would be significant because the policies of 
Japan and the United States are similar and there is a history of policy-sharing and collaboration between the 
two countries. See Toshiko Takenaka, The Current Status of U.S.-Japan IPR Systems: Convergence, 
Cooperation, and Conflict, CTR. ON JAPANESE ECON. & BUS., COLUM. UNIV. BUS. SCH., 3 (Feb. 15, 2002), 
http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:113290. 
131. Pablo Garibian & Rachelle Younglai, Canada, Mexico Ask to Join Pan-Pacific Trade Talks, 
REUTERS (Nov. 13, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/14/us-apec-canada-tpp-idUSTRE7 AC12 
B20111114. 
132. Krista Cox, KEI Notes from the Ninth Round of TPPA Negotiations, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L 
(Oct. 28, 2011, 11:51 AM), http://keionline.org/node/1306. 
133. Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 129.  
134. Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Paradigm or Wolf in Sheep’s 
Clothing, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 27, 28, 39-40 (2011). 
135. Id.; Trans-Pacific Partnership Leaders’ Statement, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Nov. 12, 
2011), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/november/trans-pacific-partner ship-leaders-
statement; The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Trade Ministers’ Report to Leaders, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE (Nov. 12, 2011), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/ 2011/november/trans-
pacific-partnership-tpp-trade-ministers’-re. 
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type of expansion the leaders seek, the agreement must be one that attracts other 
participants. However, Meredith Kolsky Lewis warns, “[the] more TPP[A] looks 
like a series of bilateral U.S. FTAs with exclusions for products the United States 
considers sensitive, the less likely the TPP[A] will attract other countries to 
accede.”136 This warning is particularly applicable in light of the United States’ 
stated objective “to negotiate trade agreements in terms of [intellectual property 
rights] that ‘reflect a standard of protection similar to that found in U.S. law,’”137 
meaning, a push for TRIPS-plus provisions. As is true in past U.S. FTA 
negotiations, intellectual property rights are proving to be a “sticking points” in 
TPPA negotiations.138 
Negotiations of the TPPA have been notoriously secretive.139 This has created 
concerns, in the United States and elsewhere, about accountability of government 
officials.140 In addition, the concern stems from the trend of private interests 
having a heavy influence on public international lawmaking.141 Though private 
industry actors may not sit in the negotiations, it is clear that they have 
omnipresence, “closely monitoring and critiquing the state of play.”142 
This concern was exacerbated when two drafts of the intellectual property 
rights chapter were leaked, one in February 2011 and one in September 2011.143 
Both drafts, which are indicators of what has been negotiated, contained a cover 
note saying that it would not be declassified until four years after entry into the 
TPPA.144 Secret negotiations can lead to an unbalanced final agreement. For 
example, a recently negotiated intellectual property treaty, the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (“ACTA”), also shrouded its negotiations in 
secrecy; the end result is a text resembling the entertainment industry’s wish 
list.145 Peter K. Yu identifies four public-interest concerns about ACTA’s secret 
 
136. Lewis, supra note 134, at 52. 
137. IAN F. FERGUSSON & BRUCE VAUGHN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40502, THE TRANS-PACIFIC 
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 11 (2010). 
138. Id. 
139. Jane Kelsey, Trans-Pacific Partnership Papers Remain Secret for Four Years After Deal, TPP 
WATCH (Oct. 16, 2011), http://tppwatch.org/2011/10/16/trans-pacific-partnership-papers-remain-secret-for-
four-years-after-deal/. 
140. Id. In New Zealand, for example, the secrecy of the negotiations prompted a response from 
citizens. A sign-on letter was drafted addressing the Prime Minister of New Zealand, urging that TPP texts be 
released. Open Letter ‘Release the TPPA Text’ Sign-on Letter, TPP WATCH (Feb. 10, 2011), http://tppwatch. 
org/what-is-tppa/release-the-text/. 
141. Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1595-99 (2011). 
142. Id. 
143. Kelsey, supra note 139; The Complete Feb. 10, 2011 Text of the US Proposal for the TPP IPR 
Chapter, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Mar. 10, 2011), http://keionline.org/node/1091 (positing that U.S. 
drafts should be available to the public especially when copies are distributed to all the negotiating states). 
144. Trans-Pacific Partnership Intellectual Property Rights Chapter Draft, art. 8.6(c)-(e) (Sept. 2011), 
available at http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/TransPacificIP1.pdf (leaked text). 
145. Susan K. Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAs, ACTA, and TPP, 18 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 447, 464 (2011); Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 
975, 977 n.4 (2011). 
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negotiations: “(1) lack of transparency; (2) very limited public, non-industry 
participation; (3) a huge democratic deficit; and (4) virtually no domestic or 
global accountability.”146 These same concerns are applicable to TPPA 
negotiations. Using ACTA as an indicator of what secret negotiations can 
produce, the end text of the TPPA has the potential to be a reiteration of the 
pharmaceutical industry’s wish list.147 
B.  Trade Enhancing Access to Medicines and the September 2011 Leaked TPPA 
Text 
Round Eight of TPPA negotiations, held in Chicago, concluded on 
September 15, 2011.148 During these negotiations, the Office of the United States 
Trade Representative (“USTR”) released a white paper149 outlining a new 
strategic initiative: Trade Enhancing Access to Medicines (“TEAM”).150 
According to the paper, as part of implementing TEAM, the United States has 
made trade proposals during TPPA negotiations “that are aimed at promoting 
access to medicines in [TPPA] partner markets.”151 Listed as one of the goals for 
the TPPA is the reaffirming commitment to the DOHA Declaration and to 
“[i]ncorporate important understandings on the availability of public health 
measures, based on the DOHA Declaration . . . .”152 While acknowledgement of 
the DOHA Declaration in TPPA is important in terms of preserving TRIPS 
flexibilities,153 the general language used in this white paper frustrated many, 
especially in light of the fact that so little is known about what actually is going 
on in the negotiations.154 Another TEAM TPPA goal that has received criticism is 
the “TPP access window.”155 The white paper proposes that “pharmaceutical-
 
146. Yu, supra note 145, at  998-99. 
147. Sell, supra note 145, at 464. 
148. Cox, supra note 128; Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 129. 
149. Generally, the term “white paper” is used to describe a government report. 
150. Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 129; Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Goals to Enhance Access to 
Medicines, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/webfm _send/3059 (last visited Nov. 11, 
2012).  
151. Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Goals to Enhance Access to Medicines, supra note 150. 
152. Id. 
153. See Ruse-Khan, supra note 4, at 353-58 (discussing inclusion of “Doha” language in sub-sequent 
agreements as a way to preserve flexibilities established in TRIPS). 
154. James Love, USTR Releases New White Paper on Access to Medicine: Includes Almost No 
Specifics in Terms of Negotiating Positions, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Sept. 12, 2011), http:// 
keionline.org/node/1262. 
155. See Deborah Gleeson, Trade Talks Set to Undermine Access to Medicines for the World’s Poor, 
THE CONVERSATION (Sep. 16, 2011), http://theconversation.edu.au/trade-talks-set-to-undermine-access-to-
medicines-for-the-worlds-poor-3392; see also Brook K. Baker, US Trade-Enhancing Access to Medicines 
(Access Window) in its Proposed TPP IP Text is a Sham, INFOJUSTICE.ORG (Oct. 25, 2011), 
http://infojustice.org/resource-library/trans-pacific-partnership/us-trade-enhancing-access-to-medicines-access-
window-in-its-proposed-tpp-ip-text-is-a-sham. 
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specific intellectual property protections” be available, provided that the 
pharmaceutical introduces medicines within an expedited time frame.156 This 
language is also general, however, when a new draft was leaked of the USTR’s 
proposal for the TPPA, the pharmaceutical-specific intellectual property 
protections manifested through provisions allowing longer patent terms to 
compensate for granting delays,157 data exclusivity,158 and patent-registration 
linkage.159 
The access window applies where a TPPA party allows a patent applicant “to 
obtain approval for marketing a new . . . product in its territory by relying, in 
whole or in part, on the prior approval of the . . . product by the regulatory 
authority in another [country].”160 By contrast, where a country does not rely on 
patents elsewhere to grant approval domestically, these provisions will be 
“automatic and absolute.”161 Where the access window is applicable, satisfying its 
early-access requirements is relatively easy: a pharmaceutical may begin the 
approval process by relying on any available information, including prior 
approval by another country.162 To complete the patent registration, a party may 
impose additional requirements,163 but, in the context of applying the access 
window provisions, satisfying these requirements will “necessarily [occur] after 
the commencement of the marketing approval process.”164 
While the access window may help to “drive access,”165 longer patent terms, 
data exclusivity, and patent-registration linkage may be too high of a price to 
pay. For developing and least developed countries, expedited physical access to 
patented medications does not solve the problem of pricing which inherently 
inhibits meaningful access to lifesaving drugs.166 In the context of HIV 
medications, there is a severe price differential between branded and generic 
drugs.167 The problem is exacerbated by the fact that HIV becomes resistant of 
first-line drugs, which generally do have affordable generics available.168 This 
necessitates switching to second and third-line drugs.169 However, pricing of 
 
156. Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Goals to Enhance Access to Medicines, supra note 150. 
157. Trans-Pacific Partnership Intellectual Property Rights Chapter Draft, supra note 144, at art. 
8.6(c)-(e). 
158. See id. at art. 9.2. 
159. Id. at art. 9.5. 
160. Id. at art. 9.4, 9.6, 8.6(e). 
161. Baker, supra note 155. 
162. Trans-Pacific Partnership Intellectual Property Rights Chapter Draft, supra note 144, at art. 9. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Goals to Enhance Access to Medicines, supra note 150. 
166. Gleeson, supra note 155. 
167. Background: Access to Antiretrovirals, MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERS, http://utw.msfaccess.org/back 
ground (last visited Oct. 3, 2012). 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
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second-line drugs is “over six times more than the most affordable first-line 
regimen” and a potential third-line drug could cost “[twenty] times more than the 
most affordable . . . first line regimen.”170 Therefore, while the drugs may be 
available, they will be priced out of reach for years before the requisite testing 
and registration of a generic patent can make the drug available at an affordable 
price point. Even when an affordable generic does become available, the virus 
may have again become immune, making the generic obsolete.171 Professor Brook 
K. Baker172 provides insightful criticism of the access window text, namely on 
how the interplay between provisions will generally lead to longer patent terms, 
which cancel out any benefit of expedited access.173 He argues, “[t]he desirability 
of earlier product introduction should have nothing to do with a trade off 
involving greater [intellectual property] protections that extend and strengthen 
drug company patent and data-related monopolies.”174 
The ninth round of negotiations, which took place in Lima, Peru, concluded 
on October 28, 2011.175 Though the previously leaked USTR proposal was not 
discussed, international disapproval over the contents of the leaked text was more 
than just background noise.176 On October 25, 2011, Peruvian groups staged a 
demonstration and appeared on the evening news.177 Additionally, during this 
round, various groups and individuals circulated five letters containing over 
eighty signatures imploring their respective countries to increase transparency of 
the negotiations by releasing negotiating text and guidelines.178 
In the March 2012 round of negotiations, for the first time since the U.S. text 
was leaked, patent protection discussions focused on the “access window.”179 An 
observer noted that the concept seemed to get little support, and stakeholder 
organizations from at least four Trans-Pacific Partnership countries heavily 
criticized it.180 
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C.  What Next?181 
Since March 2012, the United States has been markedly more inclusive in its 
official coverage of TPP negotiations. The USTR website now features a blog 
and links to its Twitter and Facebook pages.182 Prior to the twelfth round of 
negotiations, which were held on May 8–18, 2012, in Dallas, Texas, the office 
had only been issuing “updates” at the close of each round.183 The Dallas round 
also marked a step in the direction of more transparency.184 According to the 
USTR, “more than 300 stakeholders from non-governmental organizations, 
academia, business, and the public” were invited to present their views directly to 
negotiators.185 In response to concerns from Congress and the public regarding 
Internet freedom issues, the USTR took steps to be more transparent by releasing 
an outline of proposals that would touch on those issues.186 This may be a signal 
that communication and transparency between negotiators and the public in 
general are on an upward trend.187 Specifically for public health advocates, it may 
mean that transparency in the pharmaceutical-related proposals will follow 
closely behind.188 
V. CONCLUSION 
While pharmaceutical interests have historically been well-represented, the 
public-health lobby has grown exponentially in size and resources. It is no longer 
appropriate to view the battle between increased intellectual property rights and 
protection of public-health objectives as one that is fought between mismatched 
opponents. Public health professionals, non-governmental organizations, legal 
scholars, and whole governments have all responded to free trade agreements 
such as CAFTA, and most recently to the potential Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement. The demand of the public-health lobby is clear: stop building trade 
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agreements with restrictions that operate to render TRIPS flexibilities useless and 
push out generic competition. 
“Prices fall as generic competition increases.”189 When countries are obligated to 
incorporate intellectual property rights that stifle generic competition, prohibitive 
pricing continues to block access to essential medicines like anti-retrovirals for 
HIV/AIDS patients. At the end of the day, each of the protections discussed in this 
Comment (data exclusivity, prohibition of parallel importation, and 
patent/registration linkage) make meaningful generic competition nearly impossible. 
Furthermore, when waiting for market-entry of a generic is impracticable in the face 
of a health crisis, TRIPS flexibilities like compulsory licensing are rendered useless 
because TRIPS-plus obligations effectively block the use of them.190 The DOHA 
Declaration was supposed to make public health a priority. However, a patent 
scheme that allows for public-health measures in theory, but in its application, 
prohibits such measures cannot be said to comply with TRIPS and the DOHA 
Declaration. 
As it stands, the United States’ proposal for the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement includes data exclusivity, patent/registration linkage, and longer patent 
terms in general,191 all of which are masked in the TEAM approach as a tradeoff for 
expedited access.192 
One size certainly does not fit all. Broadly speaking, in a “living” agreement like 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, it is essential that policy space be kept 
open so that lesser-developed countries may take advantage of the other benefits of 
the agreement without giving away their ability to respond to the health needs of 
their citizens.193 While it is impractical to suggest that the agreement contain no 
TRIPS-plus intellectual property rights, it is irresponsible to include all of them 
without regard to how countries can continue to use TRIPS flexibilities to provide 
access to essential drugs. 
In June 2011, at the conclusion of a United Nations High Level Meeting on 
AIDS, governments pledged to extend the reach of HIV treatment to nine million 
more patients.194 To reach this goal, pricing of treatment must come down. This can 
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only happen if countries can utilize compulsory licensing and enjoy the benefits of 
generic competition.195 Developing countries must have the flexibility to account for 
this continuing public crisis.196 This will not come to fruition unless future trade 
agreements, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, resist the temptation 
to burden all parties with intellectual property obligations that mirror U.S. domestic 
law. 
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